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Friends of the Eel River, ICCTA Preemption, and the Future of
California High Speed Rail Litigation
Christopher J. Butcher and Johannah E. Kramer*
Introduction
In July 2017, the California Supreme Court held in Friends of Eel River v.
North Coast Railroad Authority (Eel River) that the federal Interstate Commerce
Commission Termination Act (ICCTA) does not preempt the application of
the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) to a California railroad
project governed by the state’s subdivision, North Coast Rail Authority
(NCRA), and operated by a private lessor, Northwestern Pacific Railroad
Company (NWPCo).1 The holding interprets ICCTA’s deregulatory sphere as
allowing the state, as a market participant, to impose environmental
regulations on rail line development and repair, while also exploring the
sovereign power that California possesses in enforcing local environmental
ordinances on its own rail subdivisions.
The decision distinguishes CEQA as exempt from ICCTA’s established
per se and as-applied preemptory power over state and local environmental
ordinances and represents a shift in previous readings of ICCTA as applied
to California’s state and local environmental ordinances. The holding also
poses a possible conflict with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in City of Auburn v.
United States (“Auburn”), which held that the ICCTA is broadly preemptive of
state and local environmental ordinances that have an economic impact on
rail line projects.2 The clash between the California Supreme Court’s
holding in Eel River, the Ninth Circuit’s prior Auburn decision, and the Surface
Transportation Board’s (STB) recent declaratory orders likely sets the stage
for future litigation over this issue within the context of the California High
Speed Rail (CHSR) project.



Christopher Butcher is a Thomas Law Group Associate, and
Johannah Kramer is a Thomas Law Group Law Clerk.
1. Friends of Eel River v. N. Coast R.R. Auth. 3 Cal. 5th 677, 690 (2017)
[hereinafter Eel River].
2. City of Auburn v. U.S., 154 F.3d 1025, 1033 (9th Cir. 1998) [hereinafter
Auburn].
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ICCTA’s Preemptory Power Over State & Local Environmental
Regulations
State and federal courts have differed in their approaches to
interpreting ICCTA’s preemptory power over state and local environmental
regulations relating to projects that touch upon railroad redevelopment and
construction.
The ICCTA’s preemptory language is unquestionably broad when
addressing state actions that constitute per se unreasonable interference
with interstate commerce, but may be circumvented under certain
circumstances.3 Specifically, the ICCTA categorically preempts state or local
permitting capacity that could be used to deny a railroad the ability to
conduct part of its operations, or to proceed with activities that the STB has
authorized. Moreover, the ICCTA preempts any state and local regulations
that are directly regulated by the STB, including construction, operation, and
abandonment of rail lines; railroad mergers, line acquisitions, and railroad
rates and service.4 For state and local actions that are not categorically
preempted, the ICCTA still may preempt them as applied. When scrutinized
under the as-applied standard, preemption is only avoided upon a factual
showing that the action in question would not effectively prevent or
unreasonably interfere with railroad transportation.5
In previous rail line environmental preemption cases, California courts
have generally upheld the application of CEQA when the facts allow for
application of preemptory exceptions to the ICCTA.6 Meanwhile, the Ninth
Circuit has held that the broad language of ICCTA, coupled with the blurred
lines between economic and environmental regulation, places state and
local environmental ordinances under the preemptory purview of ICCTA
when these ordinance-mandated actions impact or impede the economic
ability of rail line projects to go forward.7

3. Town of Atherton v. Cal. High-Speed Rail Auth., 228 Cal. App. 4th 314, 330
(2014) (quoting Adrian & Blissfield R.R. Co. v. Vill. of Blissfield, 550 F.3d 533,
540 (6th Cir. 2008)).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 327 (“We need not wade into the various complexities and
intricacies presented by the broader question of federal preemption,
because on the specific record before us it is clear that an exception to
preemption, namely the market participation doctrine, applies.”).
7. Auburn, 154 F.3d at 1031 (“. . . given the broad language of [ICCTA] §
10501(b)(2), (granting the STB exclusive jurisdiction over construction,
acquisition, operation, abandonment, or discontinuance of rail lines) the
distinction between “economic” and “environmental” regulation begins to
74
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The Eel River California Supreme Court Holding
Eel River addresses CEQA’s application to state subsidiaries tasked
with acquiring, operating, and repairing state-owned rail lines. The decision
holds that the state is presumed to be entitled to engage in self-governance
in this regard and may be operating properly under the market participant
doctrine exception to ICCTA preemption.8
The Eel River litigation originated in the Superior Court of Marin
County, where environmental groups including Californians Against Toxics
and Friends of the Eel River sued NCRA in opposition of its decision to
resume service on its rail line, and for deficiencies within its CEQAmandated Environmental Impact Report (EIR).9 The disputed line is
comprised of the Eel River division, which stretches from Humboldt County
(through the environmentally sensitive Eel River Canyon) into Napa County,
where it connects with the Russian River division in Lombard, California.10
From Lombard, the line reaches its southern terminus in Mendocino
County.11 Both the Eel River and Russian River divisions of the line were
originally owned and operated by private companies, but upon economic
failure, service was suspended and the entire line fell into disrepair.12
Concerned that abandonment of freight service would damage the economy,
the state legislature created the NCRA in 1989, with the purpose of acquiring
the line and selecting an entity to repair, update, and operate transportation
services on the line.13 From 1990 to 2006, NCRA acquired ownership and
easement rights over the line, and indicated through various agreements
and plans that it was committed to CEQA compliance in relation to future
projects on the line.14 In 2006, NCRA contracted with franchisee NWPCo to
restart freight service to the line.15 In June 2011, following completion of the
freight service project’s initial study and circulation of draft EIR for public
comment, NCRA’s board of directors adopted a resolution certifying a final

blur. For if local authorities have the ability to impose “environmental”
permitting regulations on the railroad, such power will in fact amount to
“economic regulation” if the carrier is prevented from constructing,
acquiring, operating, abandoning, or discontinuing a line.”).
8. Eel River, 3 Cal. 5th at 735 – 38.
9. Id. at 699.
10. Id. at 691 – 92.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 692.
13. Eel River, 3 Cal. 5th at 692.
14. Id. at 692 – 93.
15. Id. at 694 – 95.
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EIR. This EIR approved resumption of limited freight rail service to the
Russian River portion of the line, as well as four construction and repair
activities on that portion of the line.16 The final EIR disclosed that the
project posed significant and potentially significant adverse environmental
effects, some of which could not be mitigated. It also omitted discussion of
the northern Eel River portion of the line, as the Board had no intention of
resuming service north of the Lombard connection.17
In July 2011, plaintiffs, Friends of the Eel River and Californians for
Alternatives to Toxics, filed separate petitions for writ of mandate against
NCRA and NWPCo as a real party in interest, alleging inadequacies and
CEQA violations associated with the project’s final EIR.18 NCRA responded
to petitioners’ writs by arguing that the line was subject to federal ICCTA
regulation, instead of CEQA, and removed the matters to the Ninth Circuit.19
The Ninth Circuit found that plaintiffs were not attempting to litigate a
federal cause of action and returned the matters to the state trial court.20
While litigation was pending, the NCRA’s board of directors issued a
resolution in April 2013 rescinding the final EIR, and stated that they were
not required to prepare an EIR for the project.21
The trial court held that the ICCTA broadly preempted CEQA, and the
First Appellate District affirmed.22 The First Appellate District held that the
market participant doctrine did not defeat preemption, facially disagreeing
with the Town of Atherton v. California High-Speed Rail Authority (“Atherton”)23
court’s finding of a market participant preemption exception.24 The First

16. Id. at 696 – 98.
17. Id. at 698.
18. Eel River, 3 Cal. 5th at 699.
19. Id. at 700.
20. Californians for Alts. to Toxics v. N. Coast R.R. Auth., No. C-11-04102 JCS,
No. C-11-04103 JCS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64569, at *39 (N.D. Cal. May 8,
2012).
21. Eel River, 3 Cal. 5th at 700.
22. Id. at 701.
23. Atherton, 228 Cal. App. 4th at 333 – 34.
24. Friends of the Eel River v. N. Coast R.R. Auth., 230 Cal. App. 4th 85, 117
(2014) [reversed by Eel River] (“Although Atherton presents a situation
factually and procedurally similar to the one before us, we respectfully
disagree with the court’s analysis, which overlooks the genesis and purpose
of the market participation doctrine and does not adequately answer the
question of how a third party’s challenge to an EIR under CEQA can
reasonably be viewed as part of the government’s proprietary activities.”)
(emphasis in original).
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Appellate District instead argued that Atherton inappropriately applied the
market participant doctrine,25 and differed from the facts at hand. The First
Appellate District noted that Atherton questioned whether a CEQA analysis
was required as part of the process for determining where to place a rail line,
while the present case concerned the requirement of CEQA analysis as a
condition of resuming rail operations.26 In addition to rejecting the Atherton
court’s market participant exception holding as applied to the present
litigation, the First District Court of Appeal also rejected the plaintiffs’ view
that state sovereignty and self-governance, protected under the Tenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, requires ICCTA’s preemptory power be
interpreted as sparing the state’s control over NCRA, its own subdivision.27
In December of 2014, the California Supreme Court granted
petitioners’ petition for review as related to the preemption issue. The court
began by examining the general principles of and presumptions associated
with federal preemption, and addressed the Gregory-Nixon rule.28 This rule
states that, when interpreting Congressional legislation, there must be
unmistakably clear language to establish an intrusive exercise of Congress’
commerce clause powers against a state, and that when there is the
possibility of preemption, the law should be presumed as preserving a
state’s chosen disposition of its own power, in the absence of a clear and
plain statement from the legislature.29
The court applied these general preemption principles to the ICCTA’s
statutory construction and historical background.30 The court found that,
although the ICCTA contains an express preemption provision and
contemplates a unified national rail system, it was intended to combat rail
monopolies while minimizing the need for federal regulatory control.31 The
court determined that the ICCTA expressly allows private rail owners to
govern themselves internally via market-based self-correction and corporate
bylaws, so long as those internal governances do not conflict with the ICCTA
or other federal regulatory agencies.32 The court concluded that in the
ordinary regulatory setting, where a state seeks to regulate a private rail

25. Id. at 116 – 17.
26. Id. at 108.
27. Id. at 119.
28. Eel River, 3 Cal. 5th at 704 – 05, 725 – 27 (The court introduces the
Gregory-Nixon rule via citation to Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 459 – 61
(1991), and Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 140 – 41 (2004). It
further cites to Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 590
(1985) in its discussion of the rule); See id. at 690 – 91.
29. Id. at 705.
30. Id. at 706 – 11.
31. Id. at 710 – 11.
32. Id. at 690 – 91.
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carrier, applying CEQA to condition the ability of the rail carrier to go
forward with its operations would be preempted by the ICCTA.33
Despite these preliminary findings of possible preemptory power, the
court held that the Court of Appeal’s finding was overbroad and incorrect;
and instead utilized the deregulatory nature of ICCTA, presumption
principles, and the market participant doctrine to support the view that
CEQA was not preempted by ICCTA in this case.34
The court determined that the application of CEQA to a public entity
charged with developing state property is not a classic regulatory behavior,
particularly when there is no encroachment on the STB’s regulatory
jurisdiction, or inconsistency with the ICCTA.35 Rather, they held that the
application of CEQA constitutes self-governance on the part of a sovereign
state.36
In advancing this argument, the court determined that once general
ICCTA compliance obligations are met, private rail owners may govern
themselves internally via market-based self-correction and corporate bylaws,
so long as those internal governances do not conflict with the ICCTA or
other federal regulatory agencies.37 The court found that the ICCTA’s
preemption clause does not clearly show that the ICCTA was intended to
deny decisions made by owners of rail lines, in this deregulated field, when
the state, rather than a private entity, is the owner of a rail line.38 The court
concluded further that the disputed project was within the owner’s (the
state’s) sphere of control, and that CEQA application was proper.39
Returning to the Nixon-Gregory presumption doctrine, the court
interpreted that Congress, in adopting preemptory provisions with the

33. Eel River, 3 Cal. 5th at 720.
34. Id. at 720 – 23.
35. Id. at 723.
36. Id.
37. Eel River, 3 Cal. 5th at 723 – 26.
38. Id. at 724 (“If a private owner has the freedom to adopt guidelines to
make decisions in a deregulated field, we see no indication the ICCTA
preemption clause was intended to deny the same freedom to the state as
owner. The ICCTA does not appear to us to be intended to effect a blanket
preemption of state law governing how a state’s own subdivision—its
subsidiary—will enter and engage in the railroad business, so long as there
is no inconsistency with regulation provided for by the ICCTA.”).
39. Id. at 724 – 25 (The Court bolstered its stance by citing to the STB’s
decision to not regulate track repair and renovation on the line, and the
STB’s determinations that the project did not cross the threshold for
establishing the requirement of federal environmental review. Under this
unregulated sphere, the state was free to regulate itself via CEQA).
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ICCTA, did not intend to deprive the state of its sovereign authority over
internal governance.40 The court found that ICCTA preemption of CEQA
mandates in this case would interpose improper federal authority between
California and NRCA, its own municipal subdivision, constituting a federal
threat of encroachment on the state’s arrangement for conducting its
government.41 Absent language otherwise, the state, operating under the
Gregory-Nixon standard of skepticism, presumed that Congress did not intend
to preempt or intrude upon the state’s ability to self-govern.42 Preempting
the state’s ability to adopt laws governing its own development schemes
would leave the state without the tools to govern its own subdivision, thus
depriving the state of its ability to make decisions to carry out goals, which
the state legislated, regarding its own development projects. 43 This includes
undertaking environmental mitigation or deciding not to undertake a project
at all because of its environmental hazards.44 The court found that affirming
ICCTA preemption over CEQA would commit the state to a one-way ratchet
– able to enter the rail business, but without the capacity to require anything
of the subordinate agency it set up to carry out the state’s rail initiative.45
The court then turned to its second interpretive presumption, finding
that the market participant doctrine applied, and holding that the state was
not acting as a regulator of others, but rather, as a marketplace participant,
entitled to the same rights and protections as private actors in the market.46
The court acknowledged that the market participant doctrine is not entirely
on point because it is ordinarily used to analyze preemption when a state
interacts with private parties as a participant in a private marketplace, and
does not address a state’s ability to govern its own governmental
subsidiary.47 Nevertheless, the court continued its analysis under the
doctrine, and held that, because states operating in a private marketplace
are subject to the same burdens imposed by Congress on private owners,
courts will presume that Congress will afford states, as owners, the same

40. Id. at 725.
41. Eel River, 3 Cal. 5th at 729.
42. Id. at 729, quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991)
(“Crucially, what is at stake here is the state trying to govern itself—to engage
in ‘decisions[s] [sic] of the most fundamental sort for a sovereign entity.’”
(original emphasis)).
43. Eel River, 3 Cal. 5th at 729 – 30.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 730 – 31.
46. Id. at 734.
47. Id. at 736.
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freedoms as private parties.48 In applying this presumption (due to the
nonregulatory behavior of state’s action), the court determined that the
application of CEQA to NCRA could be analogized to a private corporation’s
enforcement of its own bylaws. For this reason, the court concluded the
State, like a private actor, was entitled to the market participant exception to
provide it with the freedom to govern how its subsidiary engaged in the
railroad business.49
The court was careful to establish that CEQA-mandated actions might
cross the line into as-applied preempted regulation if the review process
imposes unreasonable burdens outside of the particular market in which the
state is the owner and developer of a railroad.50
The court also
acknowledged that its holding does not mean that the ICCTA has no power
to govern state-owned rail lines,51 and that preemption by ICCTA is proper
when addressing state regulation of rail carriers which directly conflict with
the STB or ICCTA.52

Eel River, Ninth Circuit, and STB Incongruences Likely to Foster
Subsequent Litigation
While the California Supreme Court’s holding neither provides
precedent for nor directly impacts future Ninth Circuit litigation concerning
rail line projects in California, it illustrates the inconsistencies between
state and federal interpretations of ICCTA’s interaction with CEQA. In
Auburn, the Ninth Circuit held that ICCTA’s broad and relatively

48. Eel River, 3 Cal. 5th at 736-37 (The court, again referencing the
Nixon-Gregory presumption principle, found that “… the market participant
doctrine also instructs, in part, that because states operating in a private
marketplace are subject to the same burdens imposed by Congress on private
proprietors, courts will presume that Congress would afford states, as
proprietors, the same freedoms as private proprietors.” (original emphasis)).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 731.
51. Id.
52. Auburn, 154 F.3d at 1030 (“Section 10501 of the ICCTA, which
governs the STB’s jurisdiction, states the board will have exclusive
jurisdiction over ‘the construction, acquisition, operation, abandonment, or
discontinuance of spur, industrial, team, switching, or side tracks, or
facilities, even if the tracks are located, or intended to be located, entirely in
one State.’ 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b)(2) (1997) (The same section states that ‘the
remedies provided under this part with respect to regulation of rail
transportation are exclusive and preempt the remedies provided under
Federal or State law.’)”).
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undifferentiated preemptory language was intended to protect rail lines
from improper state economic regulation.53 The California Supreme Court
has sidestepped this larger preemptory issue through its creative reading of
the ICCTA and delineation that when the state is a market participant, its
environmental—and indeed, economic—interventions are excused because
they constitute self-governance. Both cases concern themselves more with
the provisions of the ICCTA than the state and local environmental
ordinances that they purport to protect and preempt. While factually
different, the cases will likely be the subject of further litigation at the
federal level.
In Auburn, the Ninth Circuit addressed a Washington rail line
environmental review controversy in which state and local environmental
review regulations were held to be preempted by the ICCTA through
affirmation of a STB declaration to that effect.54 The court in Auburn, while
examining federal preemption principles in the context of ICCTA, warned
that, although legislative history may be a guide to understanding statutory
purpose, in the absence of a clearly expressed legislative intention
indicating otherwise, the language of the statute must ordinarily be
regarded as conclusive, and there is no reason to resort to legislative history
where statutory command is straightforward.55 In consideration of the plain
language of the ICCTA, the Auburn court held:
. . . given the broad language of [the ICCTA], (granting the STB
exclusive jurisdiction over construction, acquisition, operation,
abandonment, or discontinuance of rail lines) the distinction
between “economic” and “environmental” regulation begins to blur.
For if local authorities have the ability to impose “environmental”
permitting regulations on the railroad, such power will in fact amount
to “economic regulation” if the carrier is prevented from constructing,
acquiring, operating, abandoning, or discontinuing a line.56
Although the Ninth Circuit in Auburn addressed Washington’s state
and local environmental ordinances, the opinion turns on a broad reading of
ICCTA’s general preemptory power over state and local environmental
review laws.57 This broad interpretation of the ICCTA suggests that any state

53. Id. at 1031.
54. Id. at 1033.
55. Id. at 1029 – 1030.
56. Auburn, 154 F.3d at 1031.
57. Id. (“We believe the congressional intent to preempt this kind of
state and local regulation of rail lines is explicit in the plain language of the
ICCTA and the statutory framework surrounding it.”); id. at 1033. (“State and
81
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and local environmental review regulations are categorically preempted by
the ICCTA when they functionally operate as economic regulations—falling
under the federal regulatory purview of the Commerce Clause.58
Instead of following the Court’s ICCTA interpretation as set forth in
Auburn, the California Supreme Court in Eel River based its ICCTA analysis on
the deregulatory sphere of action, vis-à-vis an interpretive reading of the
ICCTA, as well as on a lengthy discussion of legislative history on Congress’
original intent.59 The California Supreme Court did not address whether
upholding the application of CEQA in Eel River functionally operated as an
economic regulation over the rail line. Instead, the court held that because
the state was the owner of the rail line, and because the Nixon-Gregory
standard requires unmistakably clear language to presume federal
preemption applies, unilateral state enforcement of state subdivisions take
precedent over federal preemption.60
To reach their holding, the California Supreme Court conceded that
CEQA-mandated actions might cross the line into as-applied preempted
regulation, if the review process imposes unreasonable burdens outside the
particular market in which the state is the owner and developer of a railroad,
but argued that the facts in Eel River did not cross this line because the state
imposed the regulations on itself.61
The holding in Eel River not only conflicts with Auburn, but the STB
itself has stated in declaratory orders62 that the broad reading of ICCTA
described in Auburn is intended to categorically preempt CEQA.63
Specifically, in 2014, the STB addressed the prior First Appellate District
decision,64 reversed by the California Supreme Court in Eel River, in a

local permitting laws regarding railroad operations are preempted by the
plain language of the ICCTA, and the statutory framework surrounding it.”)
58. Id.
59. Eel River, 3 Cal. 5th at 706 – 711.
60. Id. at 732 – 733.
61. Eel River, 3 Cal. 5th at 731.
62. The intent of STB’s declaratory orders are to eliminate controversy
and remove uncertainty in areas which fall under the STB’s jurisdiction. See
5 U.S.C. § 554(e) (2012); 49 U.S.C. § 721 (2012).
63. Surface Transportation Board Reporter (S.T.B.), FD 34914 at 5, (June 27,
2007), available at https://perma.cc/X4DD-VDUB (Having determined that the
STB had exclusive jurisdiction over petitioner’s rail line on ICCTA grounds,
the Board stated in its conclusion: “. . . state permitting and land use
requirements that would apply to non-rail projects, such as the California
Environmental Quality Act, will be preempted [by the ICCTA].”).
64. Eel River, 3 Cal. 5th.
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declaratory order, and found that the ICCTA categorically preempts CEQA.65
The 2014 order also held that when considering arguments alleging
infringements upon state sovereignty in this regard, that:
Our analysis indicating that [ICCTA] preempts third-party attempts to
enforce CEQA against a state agency does not infringe upon
California’s state sovereignty because the CEQA enforcement actions
are not being brought by the state. Rather, the enforcement actions
in state court are being brought by third parties against a state
agency under the guise of state law.66
In 2015, the STB issued an affirmatory order which reiterated the 2014
order and further explained:
. . . the correct analysis of [ICCTA] and congressional intent of that
provision is that application of CEQA through third-party
enforcement suits would conflict with the Board’s jurisdiction and
could potentially block or significantly delay the construction of a rail
line authorized by the Board. [citation to the 2014 order]. As a result,
[ICCTA] preempts application of CEQA [in this case,] and it is only
the environmental review conducted at the federal level [. . .] that
need be applied to the Line.67
The STB’s and federal courts’ interpretation of the ICCTA appears to
directly conflict with the California Supreme Court’s holding in Eel River, and
it is likely that these issues will be revisited by the Ninth Circuit and
potentially the United States Supreme Court in the near future, especially
given their relevance to the CHSR project.

Eel River and CHSR
California is currently in the planning, approval, and construction
stage of implementing sections of the CHSR. In consideration of the direct
and indirect (e.g., CEQA litigation) costs of CEQA compliance, the
application of CEQA to state and local approvals required to proceed with

65. See Surface Transportation Board Reporter (S.T.B.), supra note 63.
66. Id.
67. Surface Transportation Board Reporter (S.T.B.), FD 35861 at 4, (May 4,
2015), https://perma.cc/T57U-7DKC.
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the CHSR project has the potential to further inflate the costs of this
approximately $64 billion-dollar project.68
Potential CEQA-litigation related delays in development of CHSR not
only have the potential to run up the public tab to complete the project, but
ironically, could lead to increased air quality impacts. The CHSR is
scheduled to run on renewable energy during operations, as well as reduce
state transportation greenhouse gas and CO2 emissions.69 Until CHSR is
completed, individuals who would otherwise utilize the rail line may instead
be required to use fossil-fuel emitting modes of transportation to efficiently
travel between southern and northern California in the interim.
While California residents will not be able to board CHSR anytime
soon, the California Supreme Court’s holding in Eel River essentially
guarantees that the project will be on a nonstop track to federal court over
ICCTA’s preemptions provisions and the application of CEQA to CHSR.

68. Leslie Jacques, California's Bullet Train Isn't Just Fast Transit, It's a Way to
Bridge the Divide Between Rich and Poor, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2017,
https://perma.cc/BQ4J-XN46.
69. See California High-Speed Rail Authority, Contribution of the High-Speed
Rail Program to Reducing California's Greenhouse Gas Emission Levels, at 6, (June
2013), https://perma.cc/XD9M-UND3.
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